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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the benefit to hungry people in recipient countries, the use of food aid as a 
form of international assistance has become a source of contention among policy makers 
and researchers.  The accusation is that food aid promotes the onset of conflict and sustains 
conflict in already volatile areas.  This paper examines the relationship between food aid 
and conflict at the disaggregate, local level, with the purpose of determining if the provision 
of food aid increases conflict in recipient areas.  The geospatial analysis performed as part 
of this study focused on 346 individual food aid events across 17 African countries between 
January 1995 and February 2016, and 19,498 corresponding conflict events occurring during 
the same time. 
The number of localized conflict events was not found to increase with the provision 
of food aid when compared to numbers observed in the pre and post aid periods.  
Examination of the active aid period indicated that the provision of emergency aid 
increased the number of localized conflict events more than the provision of non-
emergency aid (planned or program aid).  From this finding, it is recommended that aid be 
provided as quickly as possible to segments of the population struggling due to economic 
disadvantage or isolated crop failure.  To reduce conflict associated with aid theft during 
transport, this study suggests that food aid is most effectively provided at secure 
distribution sites located away from main supply routes and in areas with well-developed 
road networks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Food aid is provided to countries experiencing periods of transitory food insecurity 
― due to natural disaster, a poor crop year or war ― or to states suffering from chronic 
undernourishment problems.  The provision of food aid in itself thus indicates the presence 
of food insecurity among at least a few segments of the population and signals the 
increasing value of food in these areas.  Any existing food production resources or 
provisions of food aid then gain an inflated value, providing incentive to control these 
goods.  Attempts to gain this advantage are likely to motivate conflict, so more conflict may 
occur in regions surrounding food aid.  If the costs associated with stealing food or staging 
attacks to gain control of a food resource outweigh the gains, then food aid would likely not 
be provided or needed in that area to begin with. 
The analysis presented in this paper attempts to expand upon existing work 
assessing humanitarian aid’s role in conflict.  Locational analysis is used with a focus on 
individual food aid events in Africa and conflict events in the surrounding regions.  Limiting 
the analysis to food aid events focuses the results on the largest form of international 
humanitarian assistance.  This study then acts as narrower look at humanitarian aid than is 
provided by much of the existing research, to determine if the allocation of food aid brings 
different results in recipient regions than does other forms of aid.  The purpose of this 
paper is to address several questions:  What is the expected effect of food aid on localized 
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conflict?  What physical and regional characteristics make a food aid distribution site most 
vulnerable to attack?  What types of aid are most affected by conflict? 
A total of 346 individual food aid events across 17 African nations and 19,498 
corresponding conflict events were considered.  These events occurred between January 
1995 and February 2016.  The relationships between each aid characteristic and 
demographic factors and conflict was tested using OLS regressions.  The effect of food aid 
on the change in incidence of conflict was then examined more closely using a first 
difference model.  Policy recommendations targeted at donor organizations are suggested 
based on the analytical findings. 
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CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 Food Security and Conflict  
Food security exists when “all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, 
nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life” (World Food Summit 1996(Rome), 
1996; Clay, 2002).  At the national level, access describes the amount of food that exists for 
human consumption within a country and measures whether sufficient food exists to feed 
the population.  This includes total production as well as trade, food stocks and food aid.  At 
the individual level, access requires not only the availability of sufficient food, but also the 
economic ability to obtain adequate nutrition.  Cyclical or transitory patterns of food 
insecurity, which are periods of reduced food access, may result from seasonal production 
variations (rainy season versus dry season) or the temporary decline in an individual’s 
purchasing power due to any number of economic and political factors.  These situations 
have the potential to push large portions of a country’s population into a food insecure 
situation at one time creating a food crisis. 
Transitory food insecurity and prolonged states of malnourishment lead to 
compromised human health, weaken the labor force and ultimately hinder economic 
development.  Food insecurity can also weaken political stability and induce conflict (Cohen 
& Pinstrup-Andersen, 1999).  Income poverty, poor health and nutritional status have been 
shown to be more closely associated with the onset of armed conflict than overall economic 
growth and performance (Pinstrup-Andersen & Shimokawa, 2008; Margulis, 2013). 
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Hunger issues pose a serious challenge to governmental and non-governmental 
institutions and policy decisions at all levels including the international level.  The 2015 FAO 
Report on undernourishment finds Africa to be the region with the highest proportion of 
hungry inhabitants with 23.3 percent of its population facing some level of food insecurity.  
This is 11 percent higher than Asia and the Pacific and nearly 18 percent higher than Latin 
American and the Caribbean, which are also regions known for struggling, developing 
countries (FAO, 2015).  There is much debate over the cause of food insecurity.  The cause 
of the food crisis in Africa has been a contested issue by policy makers looking to ease 
suffering and promote development.  Several studies point to mixed economic and political 
factors that limit access to existing food sources as a key component (Mano et al., 2002; 
USAID, 2003; Aker and Lemtouni, 1999). 
 
International Food Aid 
Food aid is the main form of humanitarian aid used by donor nations to address 
hunger, malnutrition and suffering in the developing world.  Aid of this type generally takes 
one of two forms ― direct transfers of food supplies, often with donor nations shipping 
excess food abroad, or food assistance grants.  Direct transfers of food are often favored by 
large agricultural countries, such as the United States, which use foreign aid to support 
domestic prices by reducing excess market supply.  Net food importing countries and non-
governmental organizations, which lack access to national food supplies, tend to give 
financial assistance.  Food grants allow needed food supplies to be purchased locally, either 
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in the recipient country’s own market or from one of its neighbors.  This not only reduces 
the cost of transportation, but also provides a benefit to the regional economy. 
Donor countries typically have mixed motivations in providing food aid to 
developing or crisis-ridden countries.  One objective is, of course, to feed hungry people.  
Other motivations historically have been to promote peace, improve diplomatic relations 
with foreign governments, establish foreign markets, and foster economic development.  
Motivations may vary across recipient countries and may change over time.  For example, 
the United States had four main objectives when it established the Food for Peace program 
(PL 480) in 1954.  These included ― establishing external markets, providing an outlet for 
excess agricultural production to support domestic prices, stopping the spread of 
communism, and providing humanitarian assistance.  Throughout the 1970s, food aid was 
given primarily to promote the economic self-interest of the United States.  Starting in the 
1980s, humanitarian aid became the primary stated objective (Ball & Johnson, 1996).  The 
only type of food aid still provided is through emergency and private assistance programs 
(Title II) in which donated commodities are given directly to nations in crisis. 
Despite the benefit to food insecure persons in recipient counties, the efficacy of 
food aid in reducing overall suffering and aiding local populations has received increasing 
criticism in recent years (Anderson, 1999; Nunn & Quian, 2012).  The accusation is that food 
aid promotes conflict onset, and sustains conflict in already volatile regions.  Examples of 
aid’s negative effect may be when it:  i) supplies needed materials that allow the local 
population to be freed from labor and have more time to fight, ii) gives conflict leaders 
increased access to resources or international attention, iii) helps selected groups 
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disproportionally, or, iv) assists agencies that condone or support one party in an existing 
conflict.“  Examples of aid’s positive effect include:  easing suffering, supporting local 
economies, and promoting peace. 
 
Stealing Food Aid 
Accounts of conflicts across Africa point to aid stealing as a key way in which food 
aid promotes conflict.  Both food aid grants and direct food transfers are stolen, however, 
direct food and material transfers are much more vulnerable to theft than is monetary 
assistance.  Shipments of food are particularly easy for armed factions and rebel groups to 
appropriate as they are physically transported long distances.  Supply routes often run 
through rural areas in which there is little government control or protection.  This makes it 
easy for opposition groups to attack aid convoys.  Reports indicate that up to eighty percent 
of aid shipments are stolen en route (Polman, 2010).  Lack of transportation infrastructure, 
especially a well-developed road system, has been thought to significantly increase the 
frequency by which aid is stolen prior to delivery as drivers have little to no option in routes 
they take.  This makes it easy for antagonists to anticipate the movement of aid and set 
roadblocks or traps.  Even if aid shipments successfully reach their target locations, they 
may still be kept from their target populations due to “taxes” enforced by opposition groups 
or the government.  The misappropriated aid is then used to fund conflict (Nunn & Qian, 
2012). 
The total amount of aid stolen can exceed the value of the food itself.  In many 
cases, transport vehicles and equipment are also seized and either used for the rebel cause 
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or sold for the purchase of arms.  Food grants can also be misappropriated, but doing so 
requires gaining control over the local or national government through which the funds are 
dispersed.  Incentive to gain access to this monetary resource can give armed groups 
motivation to overthrow the government.  However, acquiring the resources to do so may 
take some time, which makes more accessible aid sources, such as physical aid, to be first-
level targets for most groups (Findley et al., 2011). 
Aid is not only stolen by opposition groups but also be misappropriated by the 
government or national military.  Governments that receive aid often use their control to 
maintain political support and power.  Specific populations, such as loyal supporters or 
swing voters, are often rewarded while opponents are excluded (Uvin, 1998; Dixit & 
Londregan, 1996; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012).  In countries with already tumultuous 
political climates, favoritism in this manner is often seen as an additional form of 
corruption, and is a contributing factor in unrest and conflict.  Cases of this can be seen in 
Rwanda in the 1990s, where government misappropriation of aid was so problematic that 
aid shipments were largely canceled (Uvin, 1998), and in Zimbabwe in 2003 where only 
residents with ZANU-PF Party membership cards were allowed to collect food rations 
(Thurow & Kilman, 2009).  The fungible nature of food aid, and the continued support of 
such international assistance programs by developed nations, has made it so that food aid 
has become a logistical support system for the government and opposition groups alike.  
Some even consider aid capture as a “permanent feature of military strategy” (Polman, 
2010, p. 10). 
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Aid and Government Accountability 
One critical factor in determining the effectiveness of food aid in promoting the 
donor-intended goals is the ability of that aid to reach the intended recipients to be used for 
its intended purpose (Awudu et al., 2005; Findley et al., 2011; Nunn & Qian, 2012).  Aid is 
traditionally thought to work best in environments with high quality public institutions 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 1998).  Although the robustness of this assertion 
was brought under scrutiny by William Easterly’s 2003 paper. “New Data, New Doubts:  A 
Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s “Aid, Policies, and Growth”” (Easterly, 2003) institutional 
strength is still a factor considered by many institutions in determining aid allotments and 
disbursement.  Considering the level of democracy present in a nation is one way of 
estimating how effectively aid will be utilized throughout the recipient country (Robinson & 
Acemoglu, 2012). 
States that can raise a substantial proportion of their revenues from the 
international community are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure to 
maintain popular legitimacy (Moss et al., 2006).  In this way, large aid flows can reduce 
public participation if citizens notice their leaders are more attuned to their relationships 
with donor countries than with the needs of their nation.  This may result in a strong, 
corrupt president and a population that is not politically motivated and submissive to the 
whims of its government (van de Walle, 2001; Joseph, 2003).  Alternatively, such behavior 
may fuel opposition groups and induce conflict as citizens seek to fight against government 
corruption. 
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Market Disruption and Conflict 
An additional way in which food aid may induce conflict is through its effect on local 
markets.  This is most probable in the case of direct food transfers.  Adding a sudden, 
additional amount of food to domestic supply at low or no cost may significantly disrupt 
agricultural incomes by substantially lowering market prices (Pedersen, 1996; Kirwan & 
McMillan 2007; Smith, 2014).  This may create a disgruntled farming population and 
increase incidences of conflict. 
Dependency also becomes a concern in the case of perpetual aid.  The “aid curse” 
similar to the resource curse suggests that large aid flows create dependency that induces 
perverse incentives and leads to anti-developmental outcomes (Moss et al., 2005).  In terms 
of agriculture, domestic production may decrease thereby creating a loss of livelihood for 
the farming population and igniting conflict.  This concern is supported by decreasing per 
capita food production observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, and increasing levels of food aid 
observed during the 1970s-1990s (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005; Donovan et al., 1999).  
However, to the extent that those in receipt of aid are not in possession of their own food 
source (for example, are not farmers) or that supply is sufficiently low due to drought or 
pest infestations, adding additional supply to the market in the form of food aid may have 
little to no effect on incomes, production levels, or conflict (Awudu & Barrett, 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
Not all studies find a positive relationship between foreign aid and conflict (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2002) and some suggest that an increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
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actually reduces conflict.  The difference in findings is likely linked to the type of aid 
investigated and the empirical strategies used.  This paper does not seek to end the debate 
over the relationship between international development assistance and conflict.  It merely 
seeks to investigate further the relationship between food aid and conflict at a 
disaggregated level.  Time-series analysis of geocoded data pertaining to individual food aid 
distributions and armed conflicts are used for this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
11 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORY 
 
Food insecurity is a recognized contributor to civil unrest and is frequently included 
in standard conflict models (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Besley & Persson, 2011; Cohen, 1999).  
Food aid is provided to countries experiencing periods of transitory food insecurity ― due 
to natural disaster, a poor crop year or war ― or to states suffering from chronic 
undernourishment problems.  The provision of food aid in itself thus indicates the presence 
of food insecurity among at least a few segments of the population and the increasing value 
of food in these areas.  Any existing food production resources or provisions of food aid 
then gain an inflated value, providing incentive to control these goods.  Attempts to gain 
control of valuable food and aid resources are likely to induce conflict in regions 
surrounding food aid. 
If the costs associated with stealing food or staging attacks in order to gain control of  
food resources outweigh the gains, then food aid would probably not be provided or 
needed in that area to begin with.  The following hypotheses follow from this theorized 
relationship: 
Hypothesis 1a:  The provision of food aid increases the number of conflict events 
within 50 km of an aid event. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Conflict is more likely to occur as the distance from an aid event 
decreases. 
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This theory relies on a supply-based argument claiming that it is the lack of available 
food that increases conflict in recipient regions.  The desire to control valuable resources is 
thus the driving factor behind the conflict, not the aid itself.  This is not the argument made 
by all scholars.  The main difficulty in assessing the impact of food aid on the incidence of 
conflict arises from reverse causality and joint determination.  Specifically, is the conflict 
observed a direct result of the provision of food aid, or is the food aid being provided to 
assist those in an already volatile region?  This is a difficult distinction to make and is not 
entirely resolved through this theoretical argument, as conflict is a known cause of limited 
food production and food insecurity.  Empirically, this issue is addressed through the use of 
temporal models which assess the level of conflict in a given area before the provision of aid 
and following the aid’s receipt. 
 
Competing Theoretical Arguments 
A competing theory as to why food aid induces conflict is that it “crowds out” other 
forms of humanitarian assistance that may be more effective at conflict prevention and 
resolution.  In the case where donor nations use their excess domestic supply to fund food 
aid contributions, willingness to give is not expected to hinder any additional monetary aid 
commitments.  This may lessen any crowd-out effect between food aid and other forms of 
ODA.  Nunn and Qian explore this theory in their paper “Aiding Conflict: the Impact of U.S. 
Food Aid on Civil War”, and find no evidence of a crowd-out between food aid and other 
forms of aid (Nunn & Qian, 2012).  Additionally, they find no interaction between the aid 
provided by one country and that of other donors.  For example, if the United States were 
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to increase its food aid to Africa by one million metric tons (mt) of food annually, no other 
donor country would reduce its aid commitment. 
An additional argument is that food aid drowns out local production, disrupting the 
local economy and creating unrest.  As addressed in the review of literature, this scenario is 
most probable in the case of direct food transfers.  Adding a sudden, additional amount of 
food to domestic supply at low or no cost may significantly disrupt agricultural incomes by 
substantially lowering market prices (Pedersen, 1996; Kirwan & McMillan 2007; Smith, 
2014).  This may create a disgruntled farming population and increase incidences of conflict. 
The chances of this scenario occurring are somewhat unknown.  An examination of 
the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project’s (ACLED) listing of events in Africa, from 
1995 to the present, yields several hundred observations of farmers protesting, or violently 
resisting, policies or events with which they are unhappy.  Among these events are 
incidences of government sale of communal farming lands, clashes between farmers and 
pastoralists, and complaints about low prices and undelivered subsidy payments.  However, 
it is not possible to determine the effects of food aid on the onset of these protests from 
the available data.  In cases such as a multiday protest by Kenyan farmers in 1999 against 
the import of wheat and falling wheat prices, it is possible that the provision of food aid 
may have played a role when it is noted that Kenya received 37,670 thousand mt of 
externally provided wheat aid that year (FOASTAT).  But again, this claim cannot be made 
with certainty. 
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Expected Effects of Aid Characteristics 
Procurement of food resources for aid from farmers within the country or 
surrounding region would likely have a lower impact on conflict by reducing any supply or 
price effects on the recipient area’s local market.  However, this option is only viable for 
program aid where the intended beneficiaries are selected undernourished groups within a 
relatively stable community.  Local procurement is not assumed to be an option for 
emergency aid because emergency aid is usually provided in cases of widespread food 
shortage.  In locations where this type of aid is required, local food markets are presumed 
to be in an already volatile situation and thus the provision of aid is not thought to provide 
any additional negative market effects. 
The effect of food aid on production is likely seen only in cases of habitual aid.  
Short-term or emergency aid is not likely to affect planting decisions that are typically made 
months in advance and without knowledge of the aid that is to come.  This would suggest 
that more conflict events surround program aid sites than emergency aid sites.  However, 
the supply-based theory used in this paper refutes this argument and expects project aid to 
result in fewer conflict events than emergency aid. 
Hypothesis 2a:  Conflict is more likely to occur if the aid event type is emergency 
instead of project aid. 
 
Program aid 
Program aid typically targets select population segments such as schoolchildren or 
expectant mothers.  The overall market effects of this type of aid are presumably small as it 
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is assisting groups that were thought to be underrepresented in the market.  For example, a 
food aid program providing free lunches to 200 schoolchildren does not strictly reduce the 
number of lunches being purchased in the market by 200.  The fact that aid is targeted to 
this group suggests that prior to the provision of aid, most, if not all of these children would 
have gone without lunch.  While determining the distinct market effects of such a program 
is beyond the scope of this study, the supply-based theory assumed here suggests that no 
free lunch program would have been established had most children had access to lunch.  
The provision of aid thus implies a prior lack of food security.  Additionally, it is assumed 
that while this program aid significantly affects the target population, it does not affect the 
larger community to as great an extent. 
In cases where habitual aid does affect the purchasing power of the population as a 
whole, production is assumed to adjust over time.  Conflict events are thus expected to be 
more prevalent in regions receiving emergency aid than those with program aid due to the 
state of broad food insecurity associated with donor decisions to provide this type of aid.  
Again, food scarcity creates both a market-based and strategic incentive to gain control of 
food aid in these situations. 
 
Fungibility 
Apart from the distinction in conflict levels expected between program and 
emergency aid, the level of fungibility of the aid is also expected to have a significant effect.  
The fungibility of aid is determined by its potential to be diverted and utilized for purposes 
other than those intended by the donor.  Monetary aid is more fungible than food 
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shipments and the transportation and communication equipment used for food 
transportation is more fungible than the food being carried.  This is because these resources 
can be more easily turned into cash and used to fund opposition groups, the government or 
other causes.  Therefore, areas receiving food aid and the routes used to transport aid may 
be targeted by armed factions looking to gain cash and supplies.  Although the recipient 
community may be peaceful, the provision of aid to that area may induce conflict by outside 
forces.  The more fungible the aid, the more desirable it is to gain control over that aid and 
the more likely conflict is to occur.  Evidence suggests that conflict tends to gravitate 
towards areas with high commitments of fungible foreign aid, suggesting a positive 
feedback loop between the distribution of aid and the onset of conflict1 (Findley et al., 
2011). 
Hypothesis 2b:  Conflict is more likely to occur close to aid events consisting of 
fungible aid rather than those containing material aid. 
 
Distance from the capital 
Aid granted to the federal government may be associated with the onset of conflict 
in regions of the country outside of its capital.  Monetary aid to a government can be 
considered a form of rent, which represents income not generated through taxation.  By 
capturing the state, rebels gain access to aid rents that may be used directly, or diverted 
                                                          
1 Addison and Murshed (2001) found aid fungibility increased the risk of violence through the government’s 
use of rents for military expenditures.  Collier (2009) found that up to 40 percent of African military 
expenditures are financed by fungible aid. 
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into private hands to their benefit.  If gaining access to the government will increase aid 
rents to the capturing party by a substantial amount, then potential opposition groups may 
choose to participate in a rebellion or political coup.  This assumes the expected payoff of 
having access to aid rents outweighs the expected costs of fighting.  However, the resources 
needed to implement a successful coup require opposition groups to build a support base 
among the population.  Doing so is easier in areas in which the government has less control, 
or which would require more effort for national military forces to quell conflicts or political 
movements.  These regions tend to be those farthest from the government’s stronghold, 
which is typically considered to be the national capital. 
A study on the effects of geography on civil conflict by Buhaug et.al. finds that as the 
distance from the government stronghold increases, the duration of a conflict increases.  
This is due to the difficulty of transporting troops and supplies long distances, and limited 
familiarity with local conditions in remote or rural regions (Buhaug et al., 2009).  The 
difficulty associated with sending national troops to locations far from the capital decreases 
the chances that opposition groups will be attacked in these areas thus increasing the time 
these groups have to build the trust and support of the local population.  Additionally, 
monitoring the distribution of aid by the government is more difficult as distance from the 
capital increases.  Both of these factors provide incentives for those interested in stealing 
aid to operate away from the capital. 
An increase in monetary food aid or food loans to the federal government is 
expected to increase the incidence of conflict in outlying areas at a rate faster than in areas 
in close proximity to the capital city.  This is somewhat dependent on the capacity of 
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domestic institutions and the level of corruption within the government (Findley et al., 
2001; Grossman, 1992).  As the group’s power base grows, conflict is expected to move 
closer to the capital. 
Hypothesis 2c:  The number of conflict events observed within 50 km of an aid event 
increases with the aid’s distance from the national capital. 
 
Understanding the Theoretical Arguments in the Context of Existing Literature 
The literature reviewed suggests claims of aid-induced conflict have almost entirely 
been assessed through large-scale, national-level models that relate aggregate levels of 
conflict to total amounts of aid given (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; de Ree & Nillesen, 2009; 
Nunn & Qian, 2012).  There is little discussion of how aid influences conflict at a 
disaggregated level.  Existing evidence suggests that differences in access to aid contribute 
to conflict at the local level, either by motivating activity by rebel groups or by providing 
access to funding that fuels and sustains conflict.  Given that most aid projects are targeted 
at specific populations and that fighting caused by rebel groups and small armed militias is 
generally localized within a region or country, studies that use country-level data overlook 
the location-specific effects of aid on conflict.  Findley et al.’s 2011 paper, “The Localized 
Geography of Foreign Aid...” is a first attempt to use georeferenced data and visual analysis 
of the locational relationships between specific aid events and armed conflict events.  The 
study conducted by Findley et al. is not limited to food aid, but focuses on all forms of 
humanitarian aid that are included in the AidData dataset for Sierra Leone, Angola and 
Mozambique.  Additionally, Findley et al. are only concerned with conflict events that lead 
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to at least 25 battle deaths.  Their finding is that a spatial association exists between 
location of fungible aid and battles.  This analysis does not consider differences in aid type 
or characteristics and does not explicitly consider the level of conflict within an area before 
and after the receipt of aid.  This is not the approach taken here. 
The analysis presented in this paper expands upon this work to help fill the hole in 
the assessment of humanitarian aid’s role in conflict.  Locational analysis is used with a 
focus on individual food aid events in Africa and conflict events in the surrounding regions.  
Limiting the analysis to food aid events focuses the results on the largest form of 
international humanitarian assistance.  This study then acts as narrower look at 
humanitarian aid than is provided by Findley et al. and much of the existing research, to 
determine if the allocation of food aid brings different results in recipient regions than does 
other forms of aid.  The purpose of this paper is to address several questions:  What is the 
expected effect of food aid on localized conflict?  What physical and regional characteristics 
make a food aid distribution site most vulnerable to attack?  What types of aid are most 
affected by conflict? 
 
Theoretical Model 
Based on the review of literature, the following relationship is suggested as the 
foundation for the assessment of the impact of food aid on conflict (C) in a specific location: 
C = f(AID_AMT, FA, FUN, AID_DIST, EMER)  
where AID_AMT refers to the amount of aid, in dollars, granted to each aid event, FA 
distinguishes between multisector aid projects and those that are purely food aid, and FUN 
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is the fungibility of that aid.  AID_DIST measures the distance between the aid event site 
and every conflict event within 50 km.  EMER distinguishes between emergency and 
program aid. 
To better assess the effects of each of these variables on conflict, several control 
variables were considered.  Given that internal conflict is often tied to tensions created by 
ethnic divisions within a country, ethnolinguistic makeup is considered in terms of the 
number of ethnic groups present within the recipient community.  The number of ethnic 
groups is represented by the variable ETH. 
Hypothesis 3a:  Conflict is more likely to occur in the proximity of an aid event site 
that contains more than one ethnic group. 
Food aid distribution centers are typically located in places where they can be 
reached by the largest number of residents.  They are also often located in close proximity 
to supply routes.  The chances of both desired locational criteria being met increases with 
population density.  Therefore, conflict related to food aid is considered to be more likely in 
highly populated areas.  To account for this possibility, population density of the recipient 
area is included through the variable POP. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Conflict is more likely to occur in areas with high population density 
than in areas with low population density. 
Road quality was previously discussed as a significant factor in determining the 
proportion of aid that reaches its intended target.  The distance of an aid event’s location 
from the nearest supply route is a factor also considered because the assumption is made 
that the closer it is to supply lines, the less chance there is of aid being stolen in transport.  
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Road density and distance to supply route are considered in the empirical model as 
individual variables, ROAD and TRANSPORT and then interacted to form an infrastructure 
variable, INF. 
Hypothesis 3c:  Conflict is more likely to occur near aid sites that are in close 
proximity to main supply routes and in those with poor road density than at sites 
that are far from supply routes or in countries with high road densities. 
Lastly, CAP_DIST measures the distance between the given coordinates for the aid 
event and the country’s capital, and DEM is a proxy measure representing government 
capacity by considering each country’s level of political freedom. 
Price data are not included.  This is due to the disaggregated nature of the model.  
Prices are assumed to be relatively stable throughout the country in times of peace and 
prosperity.  This means that the incentive for conflict due to food prices is relatively equal 
across the country at most times and no one region is inherently more likely to experience 
conflict due to food prices than another.  This makes comparison across several regions 
within the same country viable without having to control for regional differences in food 
prices. 
Areas facing food insecurity due to production shortages may experience price 
shocks.  Price shocks may induce food price related conflict.  This effect is captured by the 
emergency aid provision, EMER.  Although external shocks to world prices were shown by 
Smith (2014) to increase the chance of food insecurity, the earlier assumptions given for 
this study are that the presence of food insecurity is assumed in areas receiving food aid.  
Therefore, any effects of price shocks on conflict through food insecurity are accounted for 
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through the food aid variable.  The elements captured in this theoretical framework form 
the basis of the empirical analysis that follows. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The analysis was designed to answer the questions:  What is the expected effect of 
food aid on localized conflict?  What physical and regional characteristics make a food aid 
distribution site most vulnerable to attack?  What types of aid events are most affected by 
conflict?  This analysis is conducted by testing the analytical hypotheses outlined in Chapter 
3.  The general model, or conceptual framework for this analysis, is portrayed in more detail 
by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Framework 
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Country Selection Based on Food Aid Events 
Adoption of the previously defined theoretical model into a testable empirical form 
required disaggregated data for each aid event.  Necessary information included 
disbursement amount, geographic information on the recipient area and donation start and 
end dates for each aid observation.  Although data from all African counties were 
considered, the level of precision required in the data limited the number of food aid 
donations or aid projects, “aid events”, included in the study.  The final data set included 
346 aid event observations from Cameroon (22)2, Central African Republic (12), Chad (11), 
Ethiopia (35), Gambia (4), Ghana (12), Kenya (6), Malawi (28), Mauritania (64), Mozambique 
(1) Senegal (24), Somalia (45), South Africa (6), South Sudan (8), Tanzania (21), Uganda (44) 
and Zimbabwe (3).  These observations range in donation start date from 1995 to 2016. 
As displayed in Figure 2, each aid event was mapped in relation to the corresponding 
conflict and each country’s main aid supply routes to create a visual representation of the 
geographic relationship between food aid events and conflict.  Aid events were represent 
with orange triangles, while conflict events were depicted with blue circles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The number in parenthesis indicates the number of aid event observations for that country. 
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Figure 2.  Considered Aid and Conflict Events 
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Collection and coding of aid events 
AidData’s subnational, geospatial research data sets for Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, 
and the World Bank’s development projects3 were used as sources for the aid events.  All 
projects tagged as emergency response, health and nutrition, food aid, or food security in 
the sector category, or that listed food aid or nutritional support in the project title were 
included.  Aid event observations were also taken from NGO Aid Map.  Pre-made, geocoded 
datasets were not available from this source.  Therefore, all projects tagged as food aid 
within an African country were individually examined and coded.  For cases in which a town 
or region was named specifically as the aid beneficiary, Google Maps was used to assign 
geographic coordinates to the location.  Where no sub-national location was named, the aid 
project was coded as national and coordinates were assigned for the country’s capital.  
Additionally, only aid events with specified start and end dates and donation amounts were 
included in the dataset.  This excluded approximately 125 potential observations in total.  
Exclusions were not isolated to one country, nor were they predominately associated with 
one or more country’s data.  The full data set was assembled to represent food aid events 
across Africa from 1995 to the present. 
Multisector projects, or those classified generally as emergency response or 
humanitarian aid, were coded as zero.  Although these observations contain food aid 
                                                          
3 Data from the following AidData datasets were utilized for this research:  Somalia Aims, Level 1, Version 1.0; , 
the Senegal AMP, Level 1, Version 1.4 ; Uganda Aid Management Platform (AMP), Level 1, Version 1.3; World 
Bank IBRD-IDA, Level 1, Version 1.3; and World Bank, Mapping for Results.  Other African datasets, including 
the Nigeria Development Assistance (DAD), Level 1, and version 1.4 the DRC AMP, Level 1, Version 1.2, were 
considered for this research.  Results from these data sets were excluded from the final study due to data 
limitations.  Meaning, these datasets lacked critical pieces of information necessary to the model or contained 
an insufficient number of geocoded observations for statistical robustness within the country in question. 
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elements, there is no way to delineate the proportion of food aid from total aid.  Coding 
these events as zero was done to indicate their difference from events whose purpose was 
considered to be limited to the provision of food aid.  Events with the sole purpose of 
providing food or financial assistance to improve food security were coded as one.  The 
effects of both types of events were considered in the analysis with the goal of assessing 
the direct relationship of food aid, versus other types of aid, on conflict.  As shown in Table 
1, the number of pure food aid and mixed aid events included in the study are nearly 
identical. 
Table 1.  Frequency Distribution:  Food Aid Event Type  
Provision of Pure Food Aid Frequency Percent  Cumulative 
0 172 49.71 49.71 
1 174 50.29 100.00 
Total 346 100.00  
 
Although not included as an explanatory variable in the model presented here, aid 
events were also coded as to their locational extent.  The classification system used is based 
on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s georeferencing guidelines and was condensed into 
five of the eight categories used by Findley et al. (2011). 
1:  The aid site lies within or near a specific populated place. 
2:  The aid site georeferenced refers to a district or municipality. 
3:  The aid is given to a province or is regional in scope. 
4:  The aid is national in scope. 
5:  Aid flows directly to a government entity. 
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These values can then be used for future empirical analysis to judge the relationship 
between the size of the project and the chance of conflict.  Additionally, use of the precision 
codes allows specific project types to be isolated from the full data set for further 
examination as desired. 
 
Conflict Event Selection 
Conflict data were obtained from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Database 
(ACLED).  This data set contains information on nearly all conflict events in Africa from 1997 
to the present.  Included events range in scope from armed robberies to battles with 
change of territory.  Events are considered in terms of the number of conflict onset days.  
For example, if a military campaign in an area started on March 1, 1999, and lasted until 
March 5, 1999, with violent activity reported on each day, this is coded as five different 
events in ACLED with a different date for each entry.  Dates which may have involved 
activities leading up to a conflict, but do not exhibit “active conflict”, are excluded from this 
count.  Each “conflict event” observation in this study, therefore, represents one day of 
active conflict. 
All conflict events in this dataset are individually, and precisely, geocoded.  In order 
to test the relationships between the structural, locational and demographic factors present 
in each aid event, and conflict, these data were considered only in terms of their date and 
geographic relationships to the previously chosen aid events. 
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Creating the conflict variable 
The following procedure was used to quantify the relationship between conflict and 
aid events.  Each aid event was mapped using its geographic coordinates in ArcMap.  As 
displayed in Figure 3, a ring buffer with a radius of 50 km was then created around each aid 
event.  All ACLED conflict events were then mapped on top of the buffered aid sites.  For all 
conflict events mapped within the 50 km buffer, the exact distance (in km) was calculated.  
This was done using the point distance tool.  Conflict events were then individually 
examined and coded temporally based on the start and end dates of all aid events within 50 
km. 
 
Figure 3.  Coding the Conflict Variable 
 
When an event fell on the 50 km border, it was included in the conflict count if more than 
50 percent of its locational marker breached the buffer border. 
30 
The 50 km distance was chosen as the upper limit for the analysis as this is near the 
upper bound of daily walkable distance for a healthy adult.  Therefore, it is assumed that an 
aid event or aid distribution center primarily serves individuals living with a 50 km radius.  
Limiting conflicts to those within 50 km of each aid event then limits the analysis to the 
community receiving the aid.  This helps to specify the relationship between food aid and 
conflict at the disaggregated, local level. 
 
Temporal Categorization 
Conflict events were considered within three main time ranges:  two years prior to 
the distribution of aid (“pre”), during the time the aid site or individual aid project was in 
operation (“active”), and within two years after the provided end date for the aid event 
(“post”).  Conflict events occurring outside of these time periods were also recorded in a 
fourth “outside of time period” category, coded as “none”.  A total of 19,498 conflict events 
were coded. 
It is important to note that conflict events were not found within 50 km of every aid 
event.  Of the 346 aid events considered, 107 were free from conflict in any of the 
considered time periods.  The number of conflict-free aid events observed in each aid 
recipient country is noted under the “Zero Conflicts” category in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Frequency Distribution:  Aid and Conflict Events by Country and Time Period 
Aid Recipient Countries4 
Temporal Conflict Period    
Pre Active Post None 
Total 
Conflicts 
Zero 
Conflicts 
Cameroon (22) 0 23 4 483 510 12 
Central African Rep. (12) 489 509 0 338 1,336 0 
Chad (11) 1 2 0 54 57 5 
Ethiopia (35) 76 276 73 383 808 10 
Gambia (4) 4 3 0 26 33 0 
Ghana (12) 74 68 0 78 220 1 
Kenya (6) 77 446 11 774 1,308 0 
Malawi (28) 76 194 0 200 470 7 
Mauritania (64) 6 34 11 307 358 45 
Mozambique (1) 20 44 0 93 157 0 
Senegal (24) 14 203 51 616 884 1 
Somalia (45) 676 617 997 4,051 6,341 15 
South Africa (6) 100 624 0 117 841 3 
South Sudan (8) 138 502 0 114 754 1 
Tanzania (21) 21 136 40 82 279 7 
Uganda (44) 170 2,465 489 1,597 4,721 0 
Zimbabwe (3) 61 183 0 177 421 0 
Total (346) 2,003 6,329 1,676 9,490 19,498 107 
 
The “pre-implementation” conflict events were considered in order to account for 
the lag between conflict onset and the provision of aid to the area by foreign donors.  
Additionally, this produced a baseline for the level of conflict within the area before the 
food aid was provided.  Coding conflict events temporally allowed for a pre-post analysis of 
the effect of aid on conflict.  Looking across time periods also helped with the identification 
issues previously mentioned. 
                                                          
4 The number in parentheses represents the number of aid events located in each country. 
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If an area was conflict-ridden prior to the provision of food aid, it is likely that the 
need for aid was a result of the conflict.  However, if the number of conflict events 
surrounding an aid site increased once aid was provided, it is possible that the aid itself, or 
attempts to capture the aid, were the reason for the increased in conflict in the area.  This, 
of course, is not a perfect identification methodology and is not the focus of this paper.  The 
reasons for each conflict event as well as the level of food security within the area both pre- 
and post- aid would also need to be considered to determine the direction of the 
relationship between aid and conflict.  The “post” category is less crucial to the purpose of 
this paper, but allows for study of the relationship between the residual effects of aid and 
local conflict. 
 
Additional Aid Sources and Data Manipulation 
To account for demographic and structural factors of the aid site community, data 
related to population, ethnicity, infrastructure and level of democracy were also collected. 
 
Population Density 
FAO Global Population Density Estimates for 1995, 2000, and 2015 (FGGO) were 
used to estimate the number of persons living within the immediate vicinity of each 
geocoded aid event.  These are raster data layers representing population density in terms 
of the number of people per square kilometer.  Manual coding of each site was required. 
As displayed in Figure 4, individual aid sites were mapped on top of the population 
raster image using ArcMap.  The identify tool and attributes table for the aid locations were 
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then used to locate each aid site and make a visual account of color field on which the site 
was mapped.  Color fields were specified by the FAO to indicate predetermined population 
levels.  The corresponding range was recorded for each aid site and then converted into an 
ordinal value category for use in the empirical model.  These categories are displayed in 
Table 3. 
Table 3.  Assignment of Population Density Categories 
FAO Population Density 
Categories (Person/km sq.) 
Assigned Categorical Number 
0-2 1 
2-5 2 
5-10 3 
10-20 4 
20-50 5 
51-100 6 
100-200 7 
200-500 8 
500-1000 9 
>1000 10 
 
National aid projects are coded as population category 11.  Utilizing this raster data layer 
and coding technique allows for a location-specific measure of population, which made 
possible a more precise analysis of the effects of population on the chance of conflict.  This 
is opposed to using a national or regional estimate for population density that averages 
across a greater distance, reducing precision in the measure. 
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Population density was considered in relation to each aid event’s start date.  Events 
which started in the years 1995-1998 were coded based on the 1995 population data.  Aid 
events which started in the years 1999-2007 were coded based on the 2000 population 
data.  Aid events that started in the years 2008-2015 were coded based on the 2015 
population data.  This system of coding was done to help account for population movement 
over time.  Admittedly, the use of three population points to code aid events which 
occurred over a period of 20 years is not ideal.  Population movements which occurred 
between each population estimate may not be fully captured in the data, creating a bias in 
the relationship between population density and conflict. 
 
Figure 4.  Coding the Population Density Variable 
 
Aid Amount 
The amount of aid in dollars, or a dollar equivalent, is used as a proxy for the expected 
effect of each aid event on the local community.  Larger aid events, or those with higher aid 
amounts, are assumed to have a greater impact than smaller, lesser-funded events.  
However, the magnitude of aid’s effect cannot be accurately estimated through funding 
alone.  Population size at each aid site is also expected to play a key role in determining the 
magnitude of each aid event.  For example, an aid event which is funded with $200,000 of 
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resources located in a community with 500 residents is able to provide $400 of assistance to 
each resident, whereas the same aid event in a community of 10,000 is only able to provide 
$20 of assistance.  Such an aid event is therefore assumed to have a larger impact on the 
smaller community than the larger community.  To capture the effects of population on the 
expected magnitude of each aid event, the population density variable (POP) is used.  The 
aid amount for each event is divided by the population density at that event.  This produces 
a new variable ZAID, which represents the aid amount normalized by population density.  
Explicitly: 
(1) ZAIDi = AID_AMTi/POPi 
where i indicates each aid event.  The ZAID variable is then used when considering the 
overall effects of aid on conflict. 
 
Ethnicity 
Ethnicity data were obtained in a manner similar to population data.  The 2010 Geo-
referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) data were used to determine the number of ethnic 
groups within 50 km of each aid site.  These data were used because they are one of the 
most comprehensive geocoded ethnicity datasets available.  As displayed in Figure 5, GREG 
data were mapped categorically by ethnic group name.  Aid events were then mapped on 
top of this layer and individually selected to observe how many ethnic groups were present 
within the community served by the aid as determined by a 50 km buffer around the aid 
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site5.  What the ethnic groups are was not considered in this analysis.  The number of ethnic 
groups within the vicinity of each aid event was then included in the dataset. 
A similar temporal mismatch exists in the ethnicity data as in the population density 
data.  GREG data only exist in a 2010 iteration.  This provides a single point estimate for the 
number of ethnic groups.  Movement of ethnic groups over the 20-year period of analysis is 
not captured in the data.  This creates a source of bias. 
 
Figure 5.  Coding the Ethnicity Variable 
 
Infrastructure 
Two additional pieces of gathered data include road density and a shapefile of the 
global supply routes used to supply aid.  These were taken from the 2003 FAO Food Security 
Indicators dataset and the World Bank’s GIS portal, respectively.  Road density data were 
coded in relation to each aid event’s start date.  All data were given in km/100 sq km.  These 
two data items were considered individually, and were also used to create an interaction 
variable to assess the effects of road quality and distance of an aid event from a main 
supply route on the ability of aid to be delivered to the aid event successfully. 
                                                          
5 See appendix. 
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To create this variable, the near tool was used with ArcMap to calculate the shortest 
distance (in km) from each aid event to the nearest supply route.  These values were then 
individually multiplied by the country’s road density value to give an estimate of the road 
infrastructure at each aid event site.  Explicitly: 
(2) INFi=ROADi X TRANSPORTi 
where ROAD represents the road density variable and TRANSPORT represents the distance 
between each aid event site, i, and the nearest supply route.  This improves the analysis of 
infrastructure on the incidence of conflict over the use of road density alone by creating a 
location-specific measure that accounts for proximity to supply lines as well as road quality.  
Including the effects of road density instead of just using the distance to aid as a measure of 
infrastructure helps capture the effects of average road quality across the country on the 
chance of aid reaching the specified recipient location.  This is important to consider as 
countries with low road density values have been shown in the literature to have high 
incidences of aid being stolen in transport.  Additionally, proximity to supply route may 
increase aid’s chances of successful delivery. 
 
Measure of Democracy 
Aid events from 17 countries were considered in this analysis.  These countries vary 
in their political regime type, level of political stability, institutional capacity, and type of 
personal freedoms citizens are allowed.  Each of these factors were assumed to affect the 
prevalence of conflict, donor nation’s willingness to provide aid and the effectiveness of the 
aid provided.  To account for these differences, Polity IV values for political regime 
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characteristics were used.  These values were collected from the Center for Systematic 
Peace’s annual, cross-national, data on regime trends and transitions. 
Polity IV scores generally range from negative to positive ten where a value of ten 
indicates “full democracy”.  Values between six and nine indicate a country under 
“democracy”, values of one to five indicate a country under “open anocracy6”, values 
between zero and negative five indicate “closed anocracy”, and lastly, values of negative six 
to negative ten indicate a country under “autocracy”.  Additionally, values of -66, -77 and 
 -88 are assigned to countries in war or experiencing other types of internal collapse or 
struggle. 
Aid events were then coded with the political freedom value assigned to the 
recipient country based on the event’s start date.  These data are represented by the 
variable DEM. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Conflict (C) ―the conflict variable is a measure of the number of conflict events, or 
active conflict days, that have occurred within 50 km of each aid event.  As displayed in 
Table 4, data constructing this variable are delineated into four temporal categories:  two 
years prior to the aid event’s start date, “pre”; during the aid event site’s operation, 
“active”; two years following the aid event’s end date, “post”; and outside of the aid events’ 
considered time period, “none”.  The conflict observations are given as numerical values for 
                                                          
6 The term anocracy suggests a regime with inherent qualities of political instability and ineffectiveness, as 
well as an incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices. 
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the number of conflicts occurring within 50 km of each aid event and within each time 
period.  The number of conflicts in each temporal category for a given aid event was shown 
to range from zero to 9,490. 
Table 4.  Frequency Distribution:  Conflict by Temporal Period 
Temporal Conflict 
Period Frequency Percent Cumulative 
 Pre 2,003 10.27 10.27 
 Active 6,329 32.46 42.73 
 Post 1,676 8.60 51.33 
  None 9,490 48.67 100 
 Total 19,498 100.00  
 
 
Independent Variables 
Aid disbursement amount (ZAID) ―the amount in dollars of the monetary aid, or a 
dollar equivalent amount of the material aid provided for each aid event normalized by the 
population density at each aid event. 
Pure food aid (FA) ―is a categorization that distinguishes those aid events providing 
only food assistance from those providing food aid along with other services.  Pure food aid 
events were coded as one.  Events with multiple purposes were coded as zero. 
Fungibility (FUN) ―the fungibility of an aid event was determined by searching the 
World Bank and other donor websites for descriptions of each donation or project.  Aid was 
coded as 0 if it was given directly in the form of food or material goods.  This was 
considered “not fungible” aid.  Aid coded as 0.5 contains a mixture of material and 
monetary resources and was considered “partially fungible”.  Fungible aid was coded as 1 
40 
and is aid that is entirely monetary in nature and includes direct cash transfers to the 
recipient government or subnational entity.  As shown in Table 5, the largest numbers of aid 
events were considered to be not fungible. 
Table 5.  Frequency Distribution:  Fungibility 
Fungibility Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 157 45.38 45.38 
0.5 106 30.64 76.01 
1 83 23.99 100 
Total 346 100  
 
It is expected that the provision of “not fungible” aid and the provision of pure food 
aid go hand-in-hand.  This is based on the assumption that the majority of food aid provided 
is done so in terms of direct transfers of food supplies from one country to another.  
However, a cross-tabulation of the pure food aid (FA) and fungibility (FUN) variables as 
depicted in Table 6, shows that material, pure food aid events account for only 26.88 
percent of all considered aid events.  While this group represents the most common type of 
aid event in the sample, the distribution between each fungibility and food aid category is 
distributed relatively normally.  In addition, the correlation coefficient between fungibility 
and the provision of pure food aid is only found to be -0.113.  This correlation, combined 
with the cross-tabulation distribution, suggests that interaction between the effects of “not 
fungible” and pure food aid is not significant.  An interaction variable for these two factors 
thus does not need to be included in the model. 
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Table 6.  Cross-Tabulation of Pure Food Aid and Fungibility 
  Fungibility  
Pure Food 
Aid 0 0.5 1 Total 
0 64 65 43 172 
  18.5 18.79 12.43 49.71 
1 93 41 40 174 
  26.88 11.85 11.56 50.29 
Total 157 106 83 346 
  45.38 30.64 23.99 100 
 
Distance to aid site (AID_DIST) ―The exact distance (in km) between each aid event 
site and every conflict event within 50 km.  As shown in Table 7, 19,498 conflict events were 
considered in this analysis.  These events occur, on average, 18.98 km from each aid site. 
Table 7.  Summary of the Distance to Aid Site Variable 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Distance to Aid Site 19,498 18.975 15.660 0 50.193 
 
Emergency aid events (EMER) ―an aid event was coded as being emergency aid if it 
was tagged as emergency in the original AidData dataset or if the project title indicated it 
was an emergency response action.  All other aid events were coded as project aid.  A value 
of 1 indicates an emergency aid event.  A value of 0 indicates a project, or planned aid 
event.  As displayed in Table 8, almost all of the events considered were planned or project 
aid. 
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Table 8.  Frequency Distribution:  Emergency Aid 
Provision of 
Emergency Aid Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 292 84.39 84.39 
1 54 15.61 100 
Total 346 100.00  
 
 
Control Variables 
Number of ethnic groups (ETH) ―the number of ethnic groups present within a 50 
km radius of each aid event.  As displayed in Table 9, most of the aid events considered 
were located in areas inhabited by one ethnic group. 
Table 9.  Frequency Distribution:  Number of Ethnic Groups 
Number of  
Ethnic Groups Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 5 1.45 1.45 
1 173 50.00 51.45 
2 105 30.35 81.79 
3 48 13.87 95.66 
4 13 3.76 99.45 
5 2 0.58 100.00 
Total 346 100.0  
 
Population density (POP) ―the number of people/km2 at the exact location of the aid event.  
As displayed in Table 10, most aid events were located in areas with permanent populations 
of 20-50 persons/km2. 
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Table 10.  Summary of the Population Density Variable 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Population Density Category 346 5.523 2.641 1 11 
 
Road Density (ROAD) ―A ratio of the length of the country’s total road network to 
its total land area.  All national, regional, and rural roads are included in this calculation.  All 
data are given in km/100 sq km.  As displayed in Table 11, the average road density of the 
17 countries included in the analysis was found to be 10.56. 
Table 11.  Summary of the Road Density Variable 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Road Density 346 10.555 11.704 0.02 45.9 
 
Distance to nearest supply route (TRANSPORT) ―The exact distance in km between 
each aid event and the nearest supply route as mapped by the World Bank.  As displayed in 
Table 12, aid events were located, on average, 59.26 km from aid supply routes.  However, 
29 aid events were located within one km of the nearest supply route and 127 events were 
located within 5 km of the route. 
Table 12.  Summary of the Distance to Nearest Supply Route Variable 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Distance to Nearest Supply 
Route 346 59.255 91.058 0 623.959 
 
Infrastructure (INF) ―a measure of the road quality and access to each aid event 
site.  This interaction term attempts to capture the ability of aid to reach its designated 
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location for the period of transport between the main supply route and the aid site location.  
The INF variable takes the following form:  INF = ROAD X TRANSPORT, where road density is 
the ratio of the compiled length of the country’s total road network to the country’s total 
land area.  This ratio is inclusive of all roadway types from national highways to rural 
passages and is used as a proxy for a measure of the country’s total infrastructure quality.  
Distance to road is the shortest linear distance (in km) between the aid event location and 
the nearest global supply route. 
Distance from the capital (CAP_DIST) ―a study on the effects of geography on civil 
conflict by Buhaug et.al. finds that as the distance from the government stronghold 
increases, the duration of a conflict increases.  This is due to the difficulty of transporting 
troops and supplies long distances and limited familiarity with local conditions in remote or 
rural regions (Buhaug et al., 2009).  The difficulty associated with sending national troops to 
locations far from the capital decreases the chances that opposition groups will be attacked 
in these areas and thus increases the time these groups have to build the trust and support 
of the local population.  Additionally, monitoring the distribution of aid by the government 
is more difficult as distance from the capital increases.  Both of these factors provide 
incentives for those interested in stealing aid to operate away from the capital. 
To account for these findings, the distance from the capital variable was constructed.  This 
value was calculated using a distance formula for GPS coordinates in decimal degrees and 
the latitude and longitude values for both a country’s capital and the aid site in question.  
This was done for all aid sites included in the study.  Distances were calculated in 
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kilometers.  As displayed in Table 13, most aid events were located away from each 
country’s capital, with an average distance of 362.36 km. 
Table 13.  Summary of the Distance from the Capital Variable 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Distance to the National 
Capital 
346 362.362 257.470 0 1326.639 
 
Measure of Democracy (DEM) ―Polity IV scores generally range from negative to 
positive ten where a value of ten indicates “full democracy”.  Values between six and nine 
indicate a country under “democracy”, values of one to five indicate a country under “open 
anocracy7”, values between zero and negative five indicate “closed anocracy”, and lastly, 
values of negative six to negative ten indicate a country under “autocracy”.  Additionally, 
values of -66, -77 and -88 are assigned to countries in war or experiencing other types of 
internal collapse or struggle.  Aid events were then coded with the political freedom value 
assigned to the recipient country based on the event’s start date.  These data are 
represented by the variable DEM. 
As displayed in Table 14, the average political freedom score attributed to the 17 
considered countries was -1.16.  This means that most of the aid events were located in 
areas under “closed anocracy” conditions. 
Table 14.  Summary of the Political Freedom Score Variable 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Measure of  Democracy 346 -1.185 5.001 -7 9 
                                                          
7 The term anocracy suggests a regime with inherent qualities of political instability and ineffectiveness, as 
well as an incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices. 
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Regression Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
The following general equation is fit using ordinary least squares (OLS) in order to 
determine the effects of each structural, demographic, and locational variable on the 
number of conflict events observed within 50 km of each aid event and across four 
temporal categories. 
(3) lnCt= β0+β1lnZAID+β2FA+β3FUN+β4lnAID_DIST+β5EMER+β6ETH+β7POP  
+Β8lnROAD+β9lnTRANSPORT+β10INF+β11lnCAP_DIST+β12lnDEM+μ 
where C is evaluated separately for each temporal period (t).  This procedure allows each 
variable to be tested for significance and to evaluate the eight analytical hypotheses 
resulting from the supply-based theoretical argument presented in Chapter 3. 
 
Considering the unequal aid event distribution 
Estimating the model in this manner gives a quantitative estimate of the effects of 
each locational and demographic factor in predicting the likelihood of conflict in a given 
area.  Fitting separate models for each time period also allows for observation of the effects 
of an implementation of aid on the onset of conflict.  This allows each analytical hypothesis 
to be tested. 
Of the 346 aid events considered throughout this analysis, 109 are located in either 
Somalia or Mauritania.  The remaining 237 aid events are split across the 15 other 
considered countries.  This distribution suggests that the relationship between the 
demographic and political factors and conflict in Somalia and Mauritania may overshadow 
the relationships in the remaining countries, biasing the results.  To consider the effect of 
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the unequal aid event distribution in the data, two additional sets of temporal conflict 
models are fit using OLS.  The first set considers only aid events located in Somalia or 
Mauritania.  This set is referred to as the “M&S” temporal models.  The second set, referred 
to as the “-M&S” temporal models, considers events in all countries excluding Somalia and 
Mauritania.  The results of these two models are then compared using the Fisher 
Transformation to determine if the unequal aid distribution altered the relationship 
between any of the independent variables and the number of conflict events. 
 
Evaluating temporal effects with a first difference model 
To test Hypothesis 1a, a first difference (FD) model is created.  This is done using 
differenced variables that account for the change in the number of conflicts between the 
pre and active periods in all countries and for the active and post periods in all countries.  
Differences between periods are represented by the variables FD_PRE_ACTIVE and 
FD_POST_ACTIVE.  Changes in the measure of democracy are also considered between the 
pre and active periods, and between the active and post periods.  Differences in democracy 
between periods are represented by the variables FD_DEM_PRE_ACTIVE and 
FD_DEM_POST_ACTIVE. 
Changes in the remaining independent variables are also considered.  These changes 
are represented by the variables:  FD_ZAID, FD_EMER and, FD_FUN.  The POP, ROAD, 
TRANSPORT, INF and ETH variables corresponding to each aid event are not found to 
change between periods.  These variables are thus excluded from the first difference 
equation.  Explicitly, the FD model is constructed using the following equation: 
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(4)  Ct-Ct-1= ZAIDt-ZAIDt-1+FAt-FAt-1+FUNt-FUNt-1 
+EMERt-EMERt-1+DEMt-DEMt-1 
This can also be expressed as: 
(5) ∆C=∆ZAID+∆FA+∆FUN+∆EMER+∆DEM 
where delta represents the change in each variable between two of the temporal periods of 
analysis.  The first difference model to test the difference between the amount of conflict 
between the pre and active periods is then written as: 
(6) FD_PRE_ACTIVE=β0+β1FD_ZAID+β2FD_FA+β3FD_FUN+β4FD_EMER 
+β5FD_DEM_PRE_ACTIVE+ μ 
The first difference equations are then fit using OLS to evaluate the change in conflict 
occurrence due to the presence of food aid in the active period. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Starting with the full conflict model (equation (3)), a series of OLS regressions was fit 
using STATA to determine the operational conflict models for all 17 aid recipient countries 
for each of the four temporal periods.  The goal of this procedure was to narrow down the 
conflict equation from all factors that may affect the onset of a conflict event, to those that 
have the most statistically significant effect.  Standard two-tail t-tests were used to test for 
each regressor’s statistical significance.  Specifically, the following hypothesis was tested for 
each regressor: 
      Ho:  βj = 0 
Ha:  βj =/= 0 
where Ho indicated the null hypothesis, Ha indicated the alternative hypothesis, and j 
represented the regressor or variable name.  Rejection of the null hypothesis indicated that 
the regressor in question was statistically significant from zero.  This indicated that this 
particular variable has explanatory power related to the dependent, conflict variable.  
Failure to reject the null hypothesis implied that the regressor in question could not be 
proven to be statistically different from zero.  These regressors were considered to lack 
explanatory power.  However, given that the use of these variables was theoretically driven, 
insignificant regressors were kept in the fitted temporal models. 
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The aid event-specific variables were not considered for the pre, post, and none 
periods.  This is because no aid was available, so including independent variables which 
describe the aid event is not consistent with these time periods. 
 
The Fit Temporal Conflict Models for all Countries 
As displayed in Table 15, the onset of conflict events in the pre aid event period was 
found to be best predicted by:  the number of ethnic groups, population density, road 
density, distance to the nearest supply route, infrastructure, distance from the country’s 
capital, and the country’s measure of democracy.  All of these variables were found to be 
significant at the 0.001 level.  Explicitly, the Fit conflict model for all countries during the pre 
aid event period was found to be: 
(7) lnCPre= 4.111-0.901ETH+0.346POP-0.570lnROAD-0.230lnTRANSPORT+0.0008INF 
-0.185lnCAP_DIST-0.018lnDEM+μ 
An increase in the number of ethnic groups in an area, an increase in road density, 
an increase in the distance from the nearest supply route, an increase in the distance from 
the capital, and an increase in democracy were all predicted to decrease the number of 
conflict events in a particular location.  Conversely, increases in population density and 
infrastructure were predicted to increase the number of conflict events. 
 
Active period 
As displayed in Table 15, the onset of conflict events for all countries during the active 
aid event period was found to be best predicted by:  the number of ethnic groups, 
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population density, road density, infrastructure, distance from the country’s capital, the 
country’s measure of democracy, distance from the aid event, the provision of pure food 
aid, fungibility, the provision of emergency aid, and the amount of aid supplied.  All of these 
variables were found to be significant at the 0.001 level.  Explicitly, the fit conflict model for 
all countries during the active aid event period was found to be: 
(8) lnCActive= 6.180-0.211lnZAID+0.167FA-0.339FUN-0.114lnAID_DIST+0.665EMER 
-0.485ETH+0.254POP-0.200lnROAD+0.0959lnTRANSPORT+0.001INF 
-0.000lnCAP_DIST-0.061lnDEM+μ 
An increase in the amount of aid, an increase in number of ethnic groups in an area, 
an increase in road density, an increase in distance to the aid site, an increase in the 
distance from the capital, and an increase in democracy were all predicted to decrease the 
number of conflict events in a particular location.  Conversely, increases in population 
density, infrastructure, and distance to the nearest supply route were predicted to increase 
the number of conflict events.  The provision of pure food aid and the provision of 
emergency aid were both predicted to increase the number of conflicts over the provision 
of combined aid events and project aid events.  Fungible, or monetary, aid was predicted to 
decrease the number of conflicts over non-fungible, or material goods, aid. 
 
Post period 
As displayed in Table 15, the onset of conflict events in all countries during the post aid 
event period was found to be best predicted by:  road density, distance to the nearest 
supply route, infrastructure, distance from the country’s capital, and the country’s measure 
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of democracy.  All of these variables were found to be significant at the 0.001 level.  The 
number of ethnic groups and population density were not found to be statistically 
significant predictors of conflict during the post period, however, these regressors remained 
in the model due to their theoretical significance.  Explicitly, the fit conflict model for all 
countries during the active aid event period was found to be: 
(9) lnCPost= 6.642-0.034ETH+0.00002POP-0.337lnTRANSPORT+.001INF 
-0.591lnCAP_DIST-0.133lnDEM+μ 
An increase in distance to the nearest supply route, an increase in the distance from 
the capital, and an increase in the measure of democracy were predicted to decrease the 
number of conflict events in a particular location.  Conversely, increases in infrastructure 
was predicted to increase the number of conflict events.  No inference about the effects of 
the number of ethnic groups or population density can be made due to their lack of 
significance. 
 
None period 
As displayed in Table 15, the onset of conflict events in all countries during the post aid 
event period was found to be best predicted by:  the number of ethnic groups, population 
density, road density, distance to the nearest supply route, infrastructure, distance from the 
country’s capital, and the country’s measure of democracy.  All of these variables were 
found to be significant at the 0.001 level.  Explicitly, the fit conflict model for all countries 
during the active aid event period was found to be: 
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(10)  lnCnone= 3.516-0.465ETH+0.342POP+0.088ROAD+0.076lnTRANSPORT 
-0.0007INF-0.237lnCAP_DIST-0.120lnDEM+μ 
An increase in the number of ethnic groups, an increase in infrastructure, an 
increase in distance to the country’s capital, and an increase in democracy were all 
predicted to decrease the number of conflicts in a particular location.  Conversely, increases 
in population density, road density, and distance to the nearest supply route were predicted 
to increase the number of conflict events. 
Discussion of the Fit Model Results 
The number of ethnic groups within 50 km of an aid event was predicted to have a 
significant negative effect on conflict in every temporal period except post.  This effect was 
found to be the largest during the pre aid period, in which an increase in the number of 
ethnic groups by one was found to decrease the number of conflicts within the 50 km buffer 
by -0.901.  Therefore, evidence suggests that analytical Hypothesis 3a, which theorizes 
conflict is more likely in the proximity of aid events surrounded by more than one ethnic 
group, is not valid.  This was an unexpected result as the literature suggests that the more 
ethnic groups in an area, the higher the chance of ethnic tension and conflict. 
The inconsistent significance of the ETH coefficients values is likely a result of bias in 
the data.  As discussed in the data and methodology chapter, one data point was used to 
code 20 years of data.  This meant that there was no variation in the ethnicity data over 
time.  Coding of the data in this manner therefore removed any explanatory power of 
comparison between temporal periods.  However, the ETH variable was still included in 
each model because of theoretical motivations. 
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Table 15.  The Fit Conflict Models by Temporal Period:  All Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lncpre lncactive lncpost lncnone    
ETH -0.901*** -0.485*** -0.034 -0.465*** 
"Number of Ethnic Groups" (-72.13) (-44.30) (-1.64) (-39.88) 
POP 0.346*** 0.254*** 0.00002 0.342*** 
"Population Density Cat." (73.17) (52.38) (0.00) (69.28) 
lnROAD -0.570*** -0.200*** 0.461*** 0.088*** 
"Road Density" (-70.31) (-24.04) (-25.12) (10.86) 
lnTRANSPORT -0.203*** 0.096*** 0.337*** -0.076*** 
"Distance to Nearest Supply 
Route" (-21.90) (9.86) (-24.26) (8.06) 
INF 0.0008*** 0.0011*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 
"Infrastructure" (35.03) (55.79) (42.29) (-33.44)    
lnCAP_DIST -0.185*** -0.089*** 0.591*** -0.237*** 
"Distance to the National 
Capital" (-54.60) (-25.14) (-43.17) (-64.90)    
DEM -0.018*** -0.061*** 0.133*** -0.120*** 
"Measure of Democracy" (-7.95) (-26.28) (-29.36) (-53.01) 
lnAID_DIST 
 
-0.114*** 
 
                
"Distance to Aid Site"  (-15.28)                  
FA 
 
0.167*** 
 
                
"Provision of Pure Food 
Aid"  
-5.36 
 
                
FUN  -0.339***                  
"Fungibility"  (-9.77)                  
EMER  0.665***                  
"Provision of Emergency 
Aid"  
(19.79) 
 
                
lnAID_AMT  -0.211***                  
"Total Aid Amount ($)"  (-46.37)                  
Constant 4.11*** 6.180*** 6.642*** 3.516*** 
 (78.62) (67.54) (61.27) (66.24) 
N 16,332 18,315 13,018 18,940 
t statistics in parentheses  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<0.001 
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The population density at an aid event site was predicted to have a significant 
positive effect on conflict in every temporal period except post.  This effect was found to be 
the largest during the pre aid period, in which an increase in the population density 
category number by one was found to increase the number of conflicts within the 50 km 
buffer by 0.346.  Therefore, evidence suggests that the analytical Hypothesis 3b, which 
theorizes conflict is more likely in the proximity of densely populated areas is valid. 
The inconsistent significance of the POP coefficients values is likely a result of bias in 
the data.  As discussed in the data and methodology chapter, three data points were used 
to code 20 years of data.  This meant that there was little variation in the population data 
over time.  Coding of the data in this manner therefore reduced the explanatory power of 
comparison between temporal periods.  However, the POP variable was still included in the 
post period model because of theoretical motivations. 
The road density coefficient for the pre, active, and post temporal categories 
predicted that an increase in road density by one percent would decrease the number of 
conflicts by -5.07, -2.00 and -4.61, percent, respectively.  The direction of this relationship 
follows the expectation as discussed in the review of literature.  However, the road density 
variable was found to have a positive effect on conflict in the none period model.  This was 
an unexpected result and is not explained well by the supply-based theory utilized 
throughout this paper. 
The assumptions regarding the effects of road density on the occurrence of conflict 
made in analytical Hypothesis 3a is not shown to hold in all cases.  The number of conflict 
events was found to be higher in areas with low density rather than high density in most 
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models, but not all.  Therefore, no definitive claim about the relationship between road 
density and conflict can be made. 
The distance to the nearest supply route variable was shown to have an inconsistent 
effect on the number of observed conflict events.  A one percent increase in the distance 
between each aid event and the main transportation route was found to significantly 
reduce the number of conflict events by -2.03 and -3.37 percent in the pre and post periods, 
respectively.  The same change was found to increase the number of conflict events by 0.96 
and 0.76 percent respectively, in the active and none periods.  Given that these two periods 
consist of the largest number of conflict observations, it is likely that this result represents 
the “typical” direction of the relationship between distance and conflict onset.  However, 
no statistical claim can be made to this effect. 
The portion of analytical Hypothesis 3c which states that conflict is more likely to 
occur near aid sites that are in close proximity to main supply routes is not shown to be 
valid.  This result, combined with the empirical evidence related to the road density 
variable, leads to the overall rejection of Hypothesis 3b and suggests that no clear analytical 
relationship between conflict and these two elements of infrastructure can be made from 
this set of models. 
The infrastructure variable is an interaction term combining the effects of road 
density and distance to the nearest supply route on conflict.  This variable captures the 
effects of aid’s ability to reach its designated location after leaving the main supply route.  A 
higher value for each of these variables is predicted by the literature to have a negative 
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effect on conflict.  Therefore, a negative coefficient value for INF is considered strictly 
better.  This is not the relationship that that was predicted by most of the temporal models. 
INF was shown to have a small positive effect on the pre, active and post temporal 
models.  INF was shown to have a small negative effect on the none model.  Although this 
effect was unexpected, the small coefficient values indicate that the overall effect between 
INF and the number of conflict events was small.  This reduces the impact of the 
coefficient’s sign on the overall relationship with conflict. 
The literature suggested a positive relationship between distance from the country’s 
stronghold and the number of conflict events.  The logic behind this relationship was that as 
distance increased, the government’s ability to quell conflict decreased, causing more 
conflict to occur and persist in areas were governmental control was least.  However, the 
opposite relationship was predicted in all of the temporal models.  Increasing distance was 
found to decrease conflict events by -1.85, -0.90, -5.91 and -2.37 percent in the pre, active, 
post and none periods, respectively.  This suggests that either the government’s stronghold 
in each of these countries is not the capital, or that incentives to attack either within, or 
near, the capital outweighed those of attacking outlying regions.  As rebel groups are 
thought to build up their power base rurally, before moving efforts toward the 
government’s powerbase, this result may also suggest that many of the actors in each 
conflict event within the considered countries already had a strong position within their 
respective countries.  Based on the findings in the empirical models, Hypothesis 2c, which 
predicts larger numbers of conflict events far from the capital does not hold. 
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On average, each of the recipient countries was found to be in “closed anocracy” at 
the onset of each aid event.  This suggests that the governments of each of the recipient 
nations are fairly ineffective, disorderly, and potentially not in a position to provide 
protection or services to their citizens.  As the measure of democracy increased by one 
number, the number of conflict events was found to decrease anywhere between -0.018 in 
the pre period model and -0.133 in the post period model.  Negative relationships between 
democracy and conflict were also found for the active and none periods.  This suggests that 
as democracy increases and governments are in a better position to provide for and protect 
their citizens, the number of conflict events, or days with conflict, decreases. 
The magnitude of this relationship was predicted to be considerably larger than in 
the post and none periods than in the pre or active periods.  This change in magnitude is 
likely because many development agencies make the provision of aid dependent on the 
government’s willingness to democratize.  As aid is provided and political freedoms then 
grow, the formerly repressed citizens may have more ability to react publically to injustices, 
inducing more conflict events. 
The total amount of aid distributed was shown to exhibit a negative relationship 
with conflict events.  For the active period, as the amount of aid provided increases by one 
percent, the number of conflict events was predicted to decrease by -2.11 percent.  On the 
surface, this relationship appears to contradict the supply-based argument made in this 
paper.  This argument suggested that the larger the aid, the greater the incentive to gain 
control over the aid, and the larger the number of conflict events that are observed 
surrounding the aid event.  However, this relationship may capture an unobserved effect. 
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The largest provisions of aid are typically given in the form of monetary assistance.  
This is fungible aid.  As shown by the FUN coefficient value, of -0.339, fungible aid is 
associated with fewer conflicts than is aid that is given directly in the form of material 
goods.  Therefore, the increase in the ZAID variable is thought to increase the chances that 
the aid is provided in a fungible form, thus decreasing the number of associated conflicts. 
These results dispute the claims of analytical Hypothesis 2b which suggests fungible 
aid is associate with more conflict events than material aid.  This conclusion works against 
the supply-based argument that the more easily the aid source can be converted to cash, 
the greater the attempt for capture.  However, this result is assumed to capture the effects 
of the provision of fungible aid directly to government entities, which reduces the ability of 
third-party capture through direct conflict.  This difficulty then reduces incentives to attack 
and the number of conflict events associated with fungible aid.  
Each of the other independent variables was shown to exhibit the expected 
relationship with conflict.  The number of conflict events was found to decrease by -1.14 
percent as the distance from the aid event increased by one percent.  This suggests that 
conflict events during the active period are more likely to occur close to the aid event rather 
than farther away.  This result supports the supply-based argument used in this paper as 
well as analytical Hypothesis 1b.  Attacking close to, or near, an aid site indicates that the 
aid itself has value, and that the value of this aid induces conflict.  However, the significance 
of the AID_DIST variable is not enough to determine a causal relationship between the 
provision of aid and the onset of conflict. 
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The provision of emergency aid was predicted to increase the number of conflicts by 
0.665 more than the provision of project aid.  This relationship follows expectations, as 
emergency aid is thought to be provided to communities suffering a widespread severe, 
acute hardship, whereas project aid is typically targeted to assist particular segments of the 
population.  This suggests that emergency aid has a higher value to more people than 
project aid.  The inflated value of emergency aid over project aid increases the incentives to 
attack emergency aid events over project events.  These results support analytical 
Hypothesis 2a. 
Finally, the provision of pure food aid was shown to have a significant positive 
relationship with conflict.  The addition of one food aid event was predicted to increase the 
number of conflict events within 50 km by 0.167.  Although this result strongly supports 
analytical Hypothesis 1a, further support from the first difference model is needed before 
any claims as to the causality between food aid and conflict onset can be made. 
 
The Effects of Somalia and Mauritania on the Fit Conflict Models 
Observations from Mauritania and Somalia composed approximately one third of 
the total aid events evaluated from the 17 aid recipient countries in this analysis.  
Polarization in the distribution of aid events of this magnitude had the potential to 
significantly bias the Fit conflict model for all countries and keep it from accurately 
representing the effects of each political, demographic and aid characteristic variable on the 
number of conflicts predicted in each temporal period. 
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To consider the effect of the unequal aid event distribution in the data, two 
additional sets of temporal conflict models were fit using OLS8.  The first set considered only 
aid events located in Mauritania and Somalia.  This set was known as the “M&S” temporal 
models.  The second set was referred to as the “-M&S” temporal models, and considered 
events in all countries excluding Mauritania and Somalia.  The sign and magnitude of each 
coefficient value were then compared to determine if the unequal aid distribution altered 
the relationship between any of the independent variables and the number of conflict 
events. 
To test for statistical significance between the correlation coefficient values of the 
same variables across the two models, the Fisher Transformation was used.  Specifically, Z-
score values for each set of variables was constructed using the following formulas: 
𝑟′ = (0.5) ln (
1 + 𝑟
1 − 𝑟
) 
𝑧 =
𝑟1
′ − 𝑟2
′
√
1
𝑁1 − 3
+
1
𝑁2 − 3
 
 
where r1 indicates the variable correlation coefficient value from the M&S model, and r2 
represents the variable correlation coefficient value from the -M&S model.  N then 
represents the number of observations of each of the corresponding models.   
Each set of correlation coefficients were then tested using the following hypothesis: 
      Ho:  r1=r2 
                                                          
8 See Appendix for regressions results. 
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Ha:  r1 =/= r2 
where Ho indicated the null hypothesis and Ha indicated the alternative hypothesis.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis indicated that the correlation coefficient values across the 
two models were statistically different, indicating that the independent variable in question 
had a different effect on the two models.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis implied that 
the two coefficient values were statistically equivalent across the two models, indicating 
that the variable in question had a statistically similar effect on the two models. 
At the 95 percent significance level, the Z-critical value was 1.96.  The null 
hypothesis was rejected with 95 percent confidence for all Z-score values that fell above 
this threshold.  All Z-score values that fell below this threshold indicated that the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected.  Data were tested for the active period in both models, as 
this period contains all of the explanatory variables that were found to be statistically 
significant. 
The magnitude and sign of at least one of the ETH, POP, lnROAD, lnTRANSPORT INF, 
DEM, and EMER variables differed between the two models.  This suggests that these 
variables have different effects on the number of conflict events predicted depending on 
the inclusion of Somalia and Mauritania.  Statistically, the null hypothesis was rejected for 
each pair of correlation coefficients.  This suggests that the independent variables are 
correlated differently with the dependent conflict variable depending on the inclusion of 
Somalia and Mauritania.  For all variables excluding ETH, correlation with the dependent 
variable was found to be stronger when only Somalia and Mauritania were considered than 
when they were excluded.  These results suggest that the unequal distribution of aid events 
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across countries affected the overall conflict model for all countries.  The effects of this 
distributional bias must be considered when evaluating the results of the all countries 
model. 
Table 16.  Testing the Strength of Correlation and the Effects of Mauritania and Somalia 
  
Correlation 
Coefficient:  M&S 
Model 
Correlation 
Coefficient:          
-M&S Model 
    
Variable Name Z-Score Decision 
ETH -0.06 -0.158 7.39 Reject Ho 
POP 0.879 0.169 89.39 Reject Ho 
lnROAD 0.312 -0.051 27.83 Reject Ho 
lnTRANSPORT -0.623 -0.011 -53.52 Reject Ho 
INF -0.488 0.161 -51.8 Reject Ho 
lnCAP_DIST -0.868 -0.268 -78.18 Reject Ho 
DEM -0.569 0.086 -54.51 Reject Ho 
lnAID_DIST -0.542 -0.161 -33.1 Reject Ho 
FA 0.332 0.178 12.3 Reject Ho 
FUN -0.611 -0.185 -38.96 Reject Ho 
EMER -0.381 0.04 -27.5 Reject Ho 
lnZAID -0.845 -0.382 -62.24 Reject Ho 
Observations (N) 10,413 11,855     
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Results of the First Difference Model 
To test Hypothesis 1a, a first difference (FD) model was created.  This was done 
using differenced variables which accounted for the change in the number of conflicts 
between the pre and active periods in all countries and for the active and post periods in all 
countries.  Differences between periods were represented by the variables FD_PRE_ACTIVE 
and FD_POST_ACTIVE.  Differences in democracy between periods are represented by the 
variables FD_DEM_PRE_ACTIVE and FD_DEM_POST_ACTIVE.  Changes in each independent 
variable were also considered.  These changes were represented by the variables:  FD_ZAID, 
FD_EMER and FD_FUN.  The POP, ROAD, TRANSPORT, INF and ETH variables corresponding 
to each aid event were not found to change between periods.  The first difference 
equations were then fit using OLS to evaluate the change in conflict occurrence due to the 
presence of food aid in the active period. 
 
Pre versus active 
As displayed in Table 17, the first difference model to test the statistical difference 
between the number of conflicts between the pre and active periods was found to be: 
(1) FD_PRE_ACTIVE=19.53-2.72E-7FD_ZAID-7.043FD_FA-5.292FD_FUN 
-9.133FD_EMER+0.877FD_DEM_PRE_ACTIVE+μ 
Neither the provision of food aid, nor its corresponding descriptive variables were 
found to significantly affect the difference in the number of conflict events between the pre 
and active periods.  Changes in democracy were also found to have an insignificant effect.  
These results indicate that analytical Hypothesis 1a cannot be considered to be valid, and 
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that the provision of pure food aid is not shown to significantly increase the number of 
conflict events within 50 km of the aid. 
 
Post versus active 
As displayed in Table 17, the first difference model to test the statistical difference 
between the number of conflicts between the post and active periods was found to be: 
(1) FD_POST_ACTIVE= 19.79-3.80E-8FD_ZAID-0.2.562FD_FA-7.387FD_FUN 
+0.3115FD_EMER+0.101FD_DEM_POST_ACTIVE+μ 
Neither the provision of food aid nor its corresponding descriptive variables were 
found to significantly affect the difference in the number of conflict events between the 
active and post periods.  Changes in democracy were also found to have an insignificant 
effect.  These results indicate that analytical Hypothesis 1a cannot be considered valid, and 
that the removal of pure food aid is not shown to significantly change the number of 
conflict events within 50 km of the aid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
Table 17.  First Difference Results 
 
 
 
  
  (1) (2) 
  
Difference Between Pre and 
Active Periods 
Difference Between Post 
and Active Periods 
fd_FA -7.043 -2.562 
"Difference in Provision of Food Aid" (-1.02)    (-0.32)    
fd_ZAID -2.72E-07 -3.80E-07 
"Difference in Total Aid Amount"       (-1.09)         (-1.34) 
fd_EMER -9.133 9.343 
"Difference in Provision of Emergency 
Aid"         (-0.95)           (0.65) 
fd_FUN -5.292 -12.86 
"Difference in Provision of Fungible 
Aid"       (-0.65)         (-1.08) 
fd_dem_pre_active 0.877  
"Difference in Democracy Between 
Pre and Active Periods" (0.73)  
fd_dem_post_active  6.670* 
"Difference in Democracy Between 
Post and Active Periods"  (2.20) 
constant               19.53***            26.46**  
 (3.15) (2.79) 
N 342 265 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND CALL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The analysis conducted for this paper considered the relationship between 346 aid 
events and 19,498 conflict events that occurred between January 1995 and February 2016.  
The nature of this relationship was tested using OLS regressions.  The effect of food aid on 
the change in the number of conflict events between each period was then examined more 
closely using a first difference model.  The overall findings of the empirical analysis are 
summarized below, followed by resulting policy recommendations. 
 
Food aid and conflict 
The provision of pure food aid was found to be significantly associated with the 
number of recorded conflict events during the active aid period for all countries.  In this 
model, the addition of one pure food aid event was predicted to increase the number of 
conflict events by 0.167.  However, when only aid events from Mauritania and Somalia were 
considered, the same provision of pure food aid was predicted to significantly decrease the 
number of conflict events by -0.158.  This result was similar to that found when all countries 
excluding Mauritania and Somalia were considered.  In this case, each pure food aid event 
was shown to decrease conflict by -4.260 events.  Given that this -M&S model displays the 
most even distribution of aid across countries, this third result is considered the most 
representative of the typical association between food aid and conflict.  The provision of 
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food aid is therefore considered to have a greater potential to reduce conflict during the 
active aid period instead of increasing conflict. 
These results were supported by the first difference model that predicted no 
significant change in the number of observed conflict events between periods of active aid 
and those without aid.  These results suggested that the food aid can be distributed in good 
conscience to those in need, without the fear of increasing local conflict. 
 
Aid characteristics and conflict 
The total amount of aid distributed was shown to exhibit a negative relationship 
with conflict events in all cases.  On the surface, this relationship appears to contradict the 
supply-based argument made in this paper.  This argument suggests that the larger the aid, 
the greater the incentive to gain control over the aid, and the larger the number of conflict 
events that are observed surrounding the aid event.  However, this relationship may 
capture an unobserved effect. 
The largest provisions of aid are typically given in the form of monetary assistance.  
This is fungible aid.  In the all countries model, fungible aid is associated with fewer conflicts 
than aid that is given directly in the form of material goods.  Therefore, the increase in the 
ZAID variable is thought to increase the chances that the aid is provided in a fungible form, 
thus decreasing the number of associated conflicts.  However, in the M&S and -M&S 
models, fungible aid was associated with more conflicts than material aid.  This was the 
expected relationship.  Given that the -M&S model displays the most even distribution of 
aid across countries, the result for this model is considered the most representative of the 
69 
typical association between fungible aid and conflict.  Analytical Hypothesis 2b could not be 
proven valid in all cases, and no consistent causal relationship between fungibility and 
conflict was determined from this analysis. 
The provision of emergency aid was predicted to increase the number of conflicts 
more than the provision of project aid in the all countries and -M&S models.  The provision 
of emergency aid was conversely predicted to decrease the number of conflict events in the 
M&S model.  The all countries and -M&S relationships follows expectations, as emergency 
aid is thought to be provided to communities suffering a widespread severe, acute 
hardship, whereas project aid is typically targeted to assist particular segments of the 
population.  This suggests that emergency aid has a higher value to more people than 
project aid.  The inflated value of emergency aid over project aid increases the incentives to 
attack emergency aid events over project events.  These results support analytical 
Hypothesis 2a. 
The M&S relationship with conflict is opposite of the expected result, but is 
presumed to be a result of the overwhelming number of conflicts in Somalia.  Therefore, in 
cases in which a country is in a constant state of conflict, the provision of emergency aid 
may work to quell fighting.  However, the statistical evidence from this analysis is not strong 
enough to make that claim. 
 
Geography and conflict 
As one moved farther away from the aid event location, the number of observed 
conflict events was found to decrease significantly.  This result was found in all cases, 
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including the M&S and -M&S models.  These findings supported the supply-based argument 
used in this paper as well as analytical Hypothesis 1b.  The prevalence of attacks close to, or 
near, an aid site indicated that the aid itself has value, and that the value of this aid induces 
conflict.  However, the significance of the AID_DIST variable was not enough to determine a 
causal relationship between the provision of aid and the onset of conflict. 
The literature suggested a positive relationship between distance from the country’s 
stronghold and the number of conflict events.  The logic behind this relationship was that as 
distance increased, the government’s ability to quell conflict decreased, causing more 
conflict to occur and persist in areas were governmental control was least.  However, the 
opposite relationship was predicted in all of the temporal models in the all countries, M&S 
and -M&S sets. 
These results suggest that either the government’s stronghold in each of these 
countries is not the capital, or that incentives to attack either within or near the capital 
outweigh those of attacking outlying regions.  As rebel groups are thought to build up their 
power base rurally, before moving efforts toward the government’s powerbase, this result 
may also suggest that many of the actors in each conflict event within the considered 
countries already had a strong position within their respective countries.  Based on the 
findings in the empirical models, Hypothesis 2c, which predicts larger numbers of conflict 
events far from the capital does not hold. 
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Demographics and Conflict 
The number of ethnic groups within 50 km of an aid event was found to have an 
inconsistent effect on conflict across temporal periods, and across the all countries, M&S 
and -M&S sets.  For example, an increase in the number of ethnic groups was predicted to 
increase the number of conflict events in all of the M&S models and the -M&S post and 
none models.  However, the same change was predicted to decrease conflict in the all of 
the all countries temporal models and the -M&S pre and active models.  Therefore, 
evidence suggests that analytical Hypothesis 3a, which theorizes conflict is more likely in the 
proximity of aid events surrounded by more than one ethnic group, is not valid in all cases.  
This was an unexpected result as the literature suggests that the more ethnic groups in an 
area, the higher the chance of ethnic tension and conflict. 
The inconsistent significance of the ETH coefficients values is likely a result of bias in 
the data.  As discussed in the data and methodology chapter, one data point was used to 
code 20 years of data.  This meant that there was no variation in the ethnicity data over 
time.  Coding of the data in this manner therefore removed any explanatory power of 
comparison between temporal periods.  However, the ETH variable was still included in 
each model because of theoretical motivations. 
The population density at an aid event site was predicted to have a significant 
positive effect on conflict in all cases excluding the all countries and -M&S post period 
models.  Therefore, evidence suggests that analytical Hypothesis 3b, which theorizes 
conflict is more likely in the proximity of densely populated areas is valid in most, but not all 
cases. 
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The inconsistent significance of the POP coefficients values is likely a result of bias in 
the data.  As discussed in the data and methodology chapter, three data points were used 
to code 20 years of data.  This meant that there was little variation in the population data 
over time.  Coding of the data in this manner therefore reduced the explanatory power of 
comparison between temporal periods.  However, the POP variable was still included in the 
post period model because of theoretical motivations. 
 
Infrastructure and conflict 
The road density coefficient was shown to have an inconsistent effect on conflict 
across temporal periods and model sets.  For the all countries pre, active, and post temporal 
models and the -M&S pre and active temporal models, road density was predicted to have a 
significant negative effect on conflict.  The direction of this relationship follows the 
expectation as discussed in the review of literature.  However, the road density variable was 
found to have a positive effect on conflict across all of the M&S temporal models as well as 
the all countries none, and the -M&S post and none models.  This was an unexpected result 
and is not well explained by the supply-based theory utilized throughout this paper. 
The assumptions regarding the effects of road density on the occurrence of conflict 
made in analytical Hypothesis 3a are not shown to hold in all cases.  The number of conflict 
events was found to be higher in areas with low density than high density in most models, 
but not all.  Therefore, no definitive claim about the relationship between road density and 
conflict can be made. 
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The distance to the nearest supply route variable was also shown to have an 
inconsistent effect on the number of observed conflict events.  A one percent increase in 
the distance between each aid event and the main transportation route was found to 
significantly reduce the number of conflict events in the all countries pre and post periods, 
the M&S pre, post, and none and the -M&S pre, post, and none temporal models.  The 
same change was found to increase the number of conflicts in active periods of all model 
sets.  This result suggested that the provision of aid was the driving factor behind the 
observed conflicts and not the distance to the nearest supply route. 
The observed active period relationships supported the supply-based argument 
utilized throughout the paper, which posits that the incentives to capture aid induce conflict 
surrounding aid sites.  Given that a negative relationship between the TRANSPORT variable 
and conflict was observed in most cases, this is likely the “typical” direction of the 
relationship between distance and conflict onset.  However, no statistical claim can be 
made to this effect. 
The portion of analytical Hypothesis 3c which states conflict is more likely to occur 
near aid sites that are in close proximity to main supply routes is not shown to be valid in all 
cases.  This result, combined with the empirical evidence related to the road density 
variable, leads to the overall rejection of Hypothesis 3b, and suggests that no clear 
analytical relationship between conflict and these two elements of infrastructure can be 
drawn from this set of models. 
The infrastructure variable is an interaction term combining the effects of road 
density and distance to the nearest supply route on conflict.  This variable captures the 
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effects of aid’s ability to reach its designated location after leaving the main supply route.  A 
higher value for each of these variables is predicted by the literature to have a negative 
effect on conflict.  Therefore, a negative coefficient value for INF is considered strictly 
better.  This is not the relationship that that was predicted by most of the temporal models. 
INF was shown to have a small positive effect on the pre, active and post temporal 
models in the all countries and -M&S sets.  INF was shown to have a small negative effect 
on all set’s none models as well as the M&S pre and post models.  Although this effect was 
unexpected, the small coefficient values indicate that the overall effect between INF and 
the number of conflict events was small.  This reduces the impact of the coefficient’s sign on 
the overall relationship with conflict. 
 
Democracy and conflict 
On average, each of the recipient countries was found to be in “closed anocracy” at 
the onset of each aid event.  This suggests that the governments of each of the recipient 
nations are fairly ineffective, disorderly, and potentially not in a positon to provide 
protection or services to their citizens.  For all countries, as the measure of democracy 
increased by one number, the number of conflict events was found to decrease anywhere 
between -0.018 in the pre period model and -0.133 in the post period model.  Negative 
relationships between democracy and conflict were also found for the active and none 
periods.  This suggests that as democracy increases and governments are in a better 
position to provide for and protect their citizens, the number of conflict events or conflict 
days decreases. 
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The magnitude of this relationship was predicted to be considerably larger than in 
the post and none periods than in the pre or active periods.  This change in magnitude is 
likely because many development agencies make the provision of aid dependent on the 
government’s willingness to democratize.  As aid is provided and political freedoms then 
grow, the formerly repressed citizens may have more ability to react publically to injustices, 
inducing more conflict events. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
The provision of food aid in itself was not found to induce an increase in the number 
of conflicts events in the aid recipient area.  Food aid should therefore be considered a 
viable way to assist hungry people across the globe.  However, this aid is considered to be 
most beneficial when it reaches the target population and is used for the intended 
purposes.  The way in which the aid is administered and the characteristics of the aid 
provided play a key role in determining the success of an aid project.  The findings of this 
study help to determine which aid characteristics and locational aspects allow food aid to 
be distributed in the most beneficial manner. 
Whenever possible, project aid should be provided to struggling segments of the 
population.  Project aid can help hungry individuals as well as struggling sectors of the 
economy before widespread crisis occurs.  By providing agricultural assistance or education 
to farmers, widespread crop failure and famine due to low levels of agricultural inputs or 
poor cultivation techniques may be avoided.  By providing nutritional assistance to 
expectant mothers and young children, the overall population may grow healthier and more 
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prosperous.  Addressing issues as soon as they arise is thought to reduce the need for 
emergency aid and thus reduce conflict events. 
When providing food aid it is important that the distribution sites be located in the 
most secure locations possible.  This typically means away from main supply routes and in 
areas with developed road networks that allow for quick passage and several delivery 
routes.  Adhering to these locational qualifications will reduce the frequency by which aid is 
stolen in transport, and increase the likelihood that the aid will assist the target population. 
The last two factors that increase aid’s potential to be utilized in the intended 
manner are that the aid be distributed directly to the needy population, and, that the aid be 
distributed by politically neutral organizations.  Providing aid through national or regional 
governments increases the chance of misappropriation.  Donating material goods instead of 
money is one way to reduce the chance of unintentionally funding government officials and 
to increase the number of citizens fed.  Additionally, ensuring that all local residents have 
equal access to aid despite race, ethnic origin or political affiliation is absolutely necessary 
to avoid local conflict.  This is best done by ensuring the distributing agents have no 
affiliation with a specific political or ethnic group and that these agents are not working to 
promote an underlying agenda.  This may be done by using aid distribution agents with no 
previous connection to the recipient area, and by frequently rotating agents between aid 
events to prevent the formation of local alliances. 
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Need for Future Research 
The number and distribution of the aid events was a limiting factor of this data set.  
Complete, geocoded aid data were only available for 17 of the 54 countries in Africa.  This 
greatly reduced the ability to generalize the results to the entire continent.  The fact that 
data were only available for selected countries suggests the presence of an inherent 
selection bias.  These are the countries which likely receive the most aid.  Therefore, by 
using this data, the effects of aid on the incidence of conflict may be overestimated for 
Africa as a whole.  The ability to generalize the temporal conflict models for all countries 
could thus be improved with the addition of additional aid event observations and the 
inclusion of more recipient counties. 
Limited data points for population density and number of ethnic groups were also 
limiting factors of this data.  The use of three population point estimates and one ethnicity 
estimate allowed for little-to-no variation in these parameters over time.  This biased the 
relationship between the provision of aid and conflict portrayed in all of the temporal 
models.  Additional population density and ethnicity data could greatly improve the 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
ADDITONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 1.  The Fit Conflict Models by Temporal Period:  Mauritania and Somalia 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lncpre lncactive lncpost lncnone    
ETH 3.605*** 0.156* 0.0435* -0.576*** 
"Number of Ethnic Groups" (10.79) (2.27) (2.27) (-51.02) 
POP 0.150*** 0.278*** 0.062*** 0.252*** 
"Population Density Cat." (19.22) (26.48) (-9.46) (55.94) 
lnROAD 4.309*** 5.824*** 0.512*** 0.026*** 
"Road Density" (108.30) (47.50) (-30.31) (3.33)    
lnTRANSPORT 
 
0.185*** 0.696*** 0.503*** -0.162*** 
"Distance to Nearest Supply Route" (-18.25) (22.99) (-63.75) (-25.08)    
INF 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.0005*** 
"Infrastructure" (-7.56) (7.76) (63.45) (-26.95)    
lnCAP_DIST 0.514*** -0.629*** 
 
0.662*** -0.191*** 
"Distance to the National Capital" (-42.70) (-40.67) (-60.36) (-59.22)    
DEM 0.054*** -0.004 
 
0.041*** -0.061*** 
"Measure of Democracy" (18.73) (-1.25) (-12.82) (-36.07) 
lnAID_DIST  -0.041***                  
"Distance to Aid Site"  (-8.69)                  
FA  -4.323***                  
"Provision of Pure Food Aid"  (-37.28)                  
FUN  0.128*                  
"Fungibility"  (2.27)                  
EMER  -0.671***                  
"Provision of Emergency Aid"  (-14.19)                  
lnAID_AMT  -0.199***                  
"Total Aid Amount ($)"  (-9.90)                  
 
Constant 3.181*** 3.448*** 8.039*** 4.938*** 
 (-9.20) (8.66) (104.77) (109.24) 
N 10,413 6,460 10,438 10,737 
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Table 2.  The Fit Conflict Models by Temporal Period:  Excluding Mauritania and  
                 Somalia 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  lncpre lncactive lncpost lncnone    
ETH -0.712*** -0.535*** 0.028 0.121*** 
"Number of Ethnic Groups" (-54.09) (-40.03) (1.37) (10.73) 
POP 0.221*** 0.226*** -0.221*** 0.187*** 
"Population Density Cat." (38.57) (35.07) (-19.56) (34.67) 
lnROAD 0.221*** -0.149*** 0.160*** 0.212*** 
"Road Density" (38.57) (-13.48) (5.02) (30.15)    
lnTRANSPORT -0.325*** 0.114*** -0.213 -0.012*** 
"Distance to Nearest Supply 
Route" (-34.19) (9.73) (-13.48) (-1.26) 
INF -0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** -0.0004*** 
"Infrastructure" (45.22) (40.61) (23.94) (-21.56)    
lnCAP_DIST -0.139*** -0.084*** -0.290*** -0.132*** 
"Distance to the National 
Capital" (-41.21) (-20.40) (-20.28) (-39.18)    
DEM 0.047*** -0.055*** -0.035*** -0.016** 
"Measure of Democracy" (18.02) (-16.53) (-4.48) (-6.29) 
lnAID_DIST  -0.105***                  
"Distance to Aid Site"  (-9.99)                  
FA  -0.160***                  
"Provision of Pure Food Aid"  (-3.57)                  
FUN  0.130*                  
"Fungibility"  (2.44)                  
EMER  1.298***                  
"Provision of Emergency Aid"  (23.63)                  
lnAID_AMT  -0.265***                  
"Total Aid Amount ($)"  (-48.51)                  
Constant -0.147 7.623 4.953*** 2.634*** 
 (-1.25) (65.09) (39.16) (47.80) 
N 9,923 11,855 6,582 12,261 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***  p<0.001  
 
